Abstract: Many recent papers have studied movements in stock, bond, and currency prices over short windows of time around macro announcements. This paper adds to the announcement effects literature in two ways. First, we study the joint announcement effects across a broad range of assets--exchange rates and U.S. and foreign term structures. In order to evaluate whether the joint effects can be reconciled with conventional theory, we interpret the joint movements in light of uncovered interest rate parity or changes in risk premia. For several real macro announcements, we find that a stronger than expected release appreciates the dollar today, but that it must either (i) lower the relative risk premium for holding foreign currency rather than dollars, or (ii) imply considerable future expected dollar depreciation.
Introduction
The study of high frequency asset price movements has examined the relationships among the unexpected component of macroeconomic announcements and various asset returns. This paper contributes to the literature in two ways. First, we consider the joint effects of U.S. macro announcements on exchange rates and U.S. and foreign interest rates of various maturities. Most prior work has considered announcement effects on a single asset or asset class. The interpretations these papers place on measured effects generally have implications about how other asset prices should have reacted to the announcement. For example, Anderson, Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega's (2003a) (hereafter, ABDV) excellent study of the reaction of exchange rates to macro announcements finds that an announcement of U.S. retail sales that is greater than expected is associated with an appreciation of the dollar. This can be reconciled with conventional exchange rate theory, e.g., the monetary model, if the announcement portends higher-than-expected U.S. income, but this should also be reflected in a rise in U.S. interest rates. Studying the joint behavior of a broad range of asset returns allows us to shed additional light on the market reaction to news.
A second significant contribution of this paper is the use of a longer span of high frequency intradaily data than used in most other papers. Our sample includes data from 1987 to 2002, a period including 2 NBER recessions. Earlier work covers a much smaller time period. For example, ABDV's sample is January 1992 to December 1998, a period in which the U.S. economy was always in an expansion phase. Fleming and Remolona (1997) , in their study of bond returns, use a 1-year sample starting in mid-1993. A longer sample period including a broader range of states of the economy should contribute to sharper conclusions.
One reason for the short samples in earlier work is the limited availability of intradaily data. In estimating the effect of an announcement, it is desirable to measure the asset price changes in a narrow window around the time of the macro announcement.
If we choose a window that is narrow enough, the information hitting the market during the window should be dominated by the macro announcement; thus, the events in the narrow window provide us an approximate natural experiment. Earlier work has shown that the average effect of announcements is completed very quickly, so that confining attention to a 20-minute window around the time of the announcement should be more than adequate. Especially for highly variable asset prices such as foreign exchange, using daily changes, which include the effect of announcements and all other information hitting the market that day, leads to very imprecise estimates of the announcement effects. Nonetheless, many papers in the literature on announcement effects use daily data instead because long spans of intradaily data were not available until recently. 1 It has proven very difficult to link asset price movements to macroeconomic fundamentals, but this is especially true for exchange rates (Meese and Rogoff (1983) ).
The systematic relationship between the surprise component of macroeconomic data releases and one-day exchange rate changes is weak and hard to detect (Hardouvelis 1 The literature measuring the effects of macro announcements on asset prices at daily or intradaily frequency is vast and includes Dornbusch (1980) , Schwert (1981) , Frenkel (1981) , Edwards (1982) , Cornell (1983) , Pearce and Roley (1983) , Frankel and Engel (1984) , Ito and Roley (1987) , Hardouvelis (1988) , Cutler, Poterba and Summers (1989) , McQueen and Roley (1993) , Ederington and Lee (1993) , Edison (1997) , Remolona (1997, 1999) , Almeida, Goodhart and Payne (1998) , Bollerslev, Cai and Song (2000) , Clare and Courtney (2001) , Kuttner (2001) , Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2002) , Gurkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2003) and Bernanke and Kuttner (2003) . Some of these papers also document a systematic relationship between the announcements and the conditional variance of asset returns. (1988) and Edison (1997)) . That is what makes the work of ABDV such a major contribution because it is able to pin down precisely estimated relations between macroeconomic surprises and exchange rate returns by using high frequency intradaily data. Fair (2003) is work closely related to this paper as it too considers high frequency intradaily data on a range of asset prices over a long period (1982 to 1999) . He identifies occasions on which the five-minute change in stock prices, bond prices or exchange rates exceeded 0.75 percentage points, and then conducts newswire searches to identify an important event that occurred at that time. An event can be identified in many (though not all) cases, and this event is often a U.S. macroeconomic announcement. Fair lists these events and studies the correlations of changes in stock prices, bond prices and exchange rates around these events. This supports the view that U.S. macro announcements are important determinants of asset prices in a narrow window around the time of the release. While Fair studies large events, we study the average effects of all announcements on changes in interest rates and exchange rates.
We follow most of the macro announcements literature in focusing on the "surprise" component of the announcements. We study 10 announcements of U.S.
indicators: CPI, PPI, Fed Funds target, GDP, unemployment rate, initial unemployment claims, housing starts, nonfarm payrolls, retail sales, and trade balance. For most releases, we measure the surprise component as the difference between the actual release and the Money Market Services (MMS) survey expectation.
For the FOMC announcement about the target Fed Funds rate, we follow Kuttner (2001) in taking the expected change from the Fed Funds futures market. We discuss possible limitations of MMS surveys and Fed Funds futures data as sources of expectations data below.
We obtain significant and quite precisely estimated effects for several macroeconomic releases on exchange rates and the term structure of U.S. and foreign interest rates. Stronger than expected real releases (e.g. nonfarm payrolls, retail sales, GDP) tend to appreciate the dollar and raise short and long-term interest rates in the U.S.
and, to a lesser extent, overseas. Higher than expected inflation (CPI or PPI) is estimated to have little effect on the exchange rate, but to raise U.S. interest rates significantly.
Tighter than expected monetary policy (i.e. a higher than expected target Fed Funds rate)
is estimated to appreciate the dollar and to raise the term structure of U.S. interest rates.
The effect on the 10-year U.S. interest rate is more precisely estimated and smaller than Kuttner (2001) obtained with a very similar methodology, but using daily data.
For the most part our point estimates for individual asset returns are quite similar to those of earlier work including ABDV (exchange rates, intradaily data), Ederington and Lee (1993) (exchange rates and U.S. interest rates, intradaily data), Remolona (1997, 1999) For several real macro releases, such as nonfarm payrolls, we find that a stronger than expected release appreciates the dollar today, and that it either (i) lowers the risk premium for holding foreign rather than dollar-denominated assets, or (ii) implies future expected dollar depreciation in excess of the original jump. If one were to assert that a stronger-than-expected U.S. release raises the risk premium for holding foreign rather than dollar-denominated assets, our results imply that this could only be consistent with an even steeper path of expected dollar depreciation following the initial appreciation.
We find that higher-than-expected CPI and PPI releases also lower the foreign exchange risk premium and/or lead to significant long-run expected dollar depreciation.
After the first version of this paper was written, we became aware of independent concurrent related work by Anderson, Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega (2003b) . They consider the effect of the unexpected component of macroeconomic announcements on a wide range of international asset returns, including exchange rates, US and foreign stocks and bonds. The set of assets they consider is different from those in this paper. We do not include any stock returns, but, unlike Anderson, Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega, do include short term interest rate futures and so consider the effects of macro announcements on US and foreign interest rates of a range of different maturities. This in turn motivates our analysis of the effect of announcements on the trajectory of expected future exchange rates and/or UIP risk premia. Our dataset also covers a longer time span.
For example, our high frequency data on foreign interest rates goes from 1989 or earlier up to the end of 2002, whereas theirs covers the period July 1998 to the end of 2002 only.
The plan for the remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 contains some theoretical discussion of the interpretation of a regression of high frequency asset returns on the unexpected component of macroeconomic announcements. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 contains the basic regression results. Section 5 contains the analysis of the effects of surprises on expected future exchange rates and the UIP risk premium, that we can obtain only by studying the simultaneous responses of interest differentials and exchange rates to the data releases. Tests for parameter stability and models allowing for time-varying parameters are reported in section 6. Section 7 concludes.
Theory On the High Frequency Response of Asset Prices to Announcements
The starting point of the announcements literature is the following regression, 3 Notice that if we are modeling the world as with a representative agent economy, for the purposes of an announcement effects paper, it must be an agent that does not know her own income or productivity. This is required because when data on income for a period ending several weeks earlier comes out, it affects markets. Similarly, inflation data for earlier periods affect the markets; thus, the agent does not know all past prices. The agents may know some elements of the state variable with certainty, but generally we allow all of them to be uncertain. For example, the model Frankel and Engel (1984) use to illustrate exchange rate jumps in response to money supply announcements is based on the assumption that the money announcements shed no light on income and are informative only about future Fed policy.
Our approach makes clear that the linear, fixed coefficient approach rests on strong assumptions and motivates us to consider time variation in the effects of macro announcements on asset prices in section 6 below. With our long sample of high frequency data, spanning two recessions, we can shed light on such questions that we could not hope to answer with adequate precision using shorter samples. To take a specific case that may have been of relevance in the 1990s, if lower-than-expected inflation is perceived to be evidence of weak demand, then agents might expect monetary policy to be loosened, causing interest rates to fall and the dollar to depreciate. But, if the unexpectedly low inflation is perceived to be evidence of productivity growth, then in some models U.S. interest rates rise and the dollar appreciates. 
The Data

The announcement surprises
We consider the effects on exchange rates and interest rates of 10 macroeconomic announcements, plus the FOMC day release of the decision about the target Federal
Funds rate, as listed in For the 8:30 announcements, we measure the expected announcement using the median survey expectation from Money Market Services. The data come from the MMS survey of money managers taken the Friday before the release of the data. These survey 4 See Glick and Rogoff (1995) and Erceg, Guerrieri and Gust (2002) for more discussion of the impact of productivity growth on real exchange rates and the trade balance. The latter paper argues that agents initially viewed the productivity acceleration in the U.S. in the 1990s as being transitory, but then came to believe that it represented a break in the trend growth rate of productivity. They back this up with survey evidence. In a dynamic general equilibrium model, they show that this can account for much of the deterioration of the U.S. trade balance, and the real appreciation of the dollar. 5 Many other countries, including Germany, do not release macroeconomic data at precise scheduled times.
data have been widely used and the properties have been much studied. They are generally found to possess reasonable properties as expectations series, as they are unbiased, pass simple forecast rationality tests, and outperform naive time series forecasts (see, for example, Balduzzi, Elton and Green (2001) Funds rate changes than MMS survey expectations in the sense that in a regression of the actual realized target Fed Funds rate on the forecasts from the futures market and the MMS survey forecast, the coefficient on the futures rate is not significantly different from one, while the coefficient on the survey forecast is not significantly different from zero.
Exchange Rate Data
Our exchange rate data consist of the 5-minute exchange rate returns for dollar exchange rates versus the DM/euro and pound, covering the entire calendar years 1987 to 2002
inclusive, from Olsen and Associates. 8 To construct these data, Olsen and Associates record all Reuters quotes, average the bid and ask, and then linearly interpolate the resulting series to get prices at exactly the required times.
From these data, we construct exchange rate returns over 20-minute windows starting 5 minutes before the data release, and ending 15 minutes after the data release.
For an 8:30 data release, we construct exchange rate returns from 8:25 to 8:45. 9 For an FOMC release, we construct exchange rate returns from 2:10 to 2:30.
Throughout this paper, we construct exchange rates as dollars per unit foreign currency, so that a positive exchange rate return represents an appreciation of the foreign currency against the dollar. The exchange rate returns are continuously compounded, and multiplied by 10,000, so they can be interpreted as (approximately) the exchange rate change in basis points.
Interest Rate Data
Our interest rate data consist of tick-by-tick transactions prices for Federal Funds futures, 3-month Eurodollar, euromark/euribor and sterling libor futures contracts, 10 year Treasury bond futures, and 10 year UK and German bond futures going back to the late 1980s. The exact dates for which we have data on each of these instruments are shown in From these data, we construct zero-coupon rates at maturities 3 months and 1-10 years at 8:25am and 8:45 am, for the US, the UK and Germany, using the method described in the appendix. We also construct zero-coupon rates at these maturities at 2:10 and 2:30 for the US alone in the same way. Hence we construct changes in zerocoupon interest rates at these 11 different maturities in 20-minute windows starting 5 minutes before the data release, and ending 15 minutes after the data release.
Basic Regression Results
For each of the 10 macroeconomic releases, we run regressions of exchange rate returns and interest rate changes over 20-minute windows around the time of the macroeconomic data release, t r , on the surprise component of the data release, t s . As noted above, the basic regression is
While heteroskedasticity is not necessarily a first-order issue in these regressions, we use heteroskedasticity-robust White standard errors. We note that the regressor t s could well be affected by measurement error, biasing the estimated coefficient towards zero. Indeed this concern motivates us to measure the surprise component of the target Fed Funds rate 10 Results including a constant are not substantially different, and are available from the authors on request. The regression could be specified to allow positive and negative surprises to have asymmetric effects. The results for these regressions are available from the authors on request, but are not shown because there is only limited evidence of such asymmetry.
from intradaily futures rates rather than from MMS surveys, so as to avoid, or at least minimize, measurement error in this surprise.
Results for Exchange Rate Returns
In Table 3 , we report the point estimates and the (uncentered) regression R-squared for the regression of each exchange rate return on each macroeconomic surprise. These regressions are run only over the 20-minute windows around the time of the macroeconomic announcement: for the announcements that are made monthly this means that there is one observation per month. The interpretation of the regression R-squared is the fraction of the variance of the exchange rate in that 20-minute window that is explained by the announcement, which is of course not at all the same thing as the fraction of the overall exchange rate variance that is explained by the announcement.
We have very similar qualitative results to ABDV, although our sample period is substantially longer than theirs. 11 The announcements are such that positive surprises represent stronger-than-expected growth or higher-than-expected inflation. For the unemployment rate and initial jobless claims, which are both countercyclical indicators, we flip the sign of the surprise so that positive surprises reflect stronger-than-expected growth for these indicators as well. The point estimates in Table 3 generally indicate that stronger-than-expected announcements lead to negative exchange rate returns, i.e. dollar appreciation. The effect is statistically significant for some, though not all, announcement-currency pairs. The elements of Table 3 can be interpreted as the effect of a one unit surprise in the macroeconomic release on the exchange value of the dollar, in basis points. The point estimates are quite small --for example if GDP 12 comes out one percentage point above expectations (quarter-over-quarter, at an annualized rate), the estimated effect is to appreciate the dollar against the other currencies by only about 10 basis points.
Some announcements are more systematically related to exchange rates than others. GDP, initial unemployment claims, nonfarm payrolls, retail sales, the trade balance, unemployment and the FOMC decision on the target Fed Funds rate are all significant at the 1% level for both currencies, with a surprise monetary policy easing being associated with dollar depreciation. The R-squared (over the 20-minutes around announcements) is over 20% for some announcement-currency pairs. Although such an association is weak, it is still a triumph by the dismal standards of modeling the relationship between exchange rates and macroeconomic fundamentals.
Results for Interest Rate Changes
We regress the changes in interest rates of different horizons on each macro surprise and plot the coefficients against the horizon of the interest rate in Figures 1 and 2 . These figures represent the effects of a one unit surprise in the U.S. macro announcement on the term structure of U.S. and foreign interest rates.
Stronger-than-expected releases tend to raise U.S. interest rates, including longterm interest rates, and the effects are in many cases statistically significant. Strongerthan-expected U.S. releases also tend to raise foreign interest rates, although by a smaller amount.
12 In the United States, there are three releases of GDP during our sample period (aside from annual and benchmark revisions). The advance release comes out about 1 month after the end of the quarter to which it refers. The next two releases (called preliminary and final) are revisions that come out about 2 and 3 months after the end of the quarter, respectively. In our data analysis we are using just the advance release.
The effect of a shock to the Fed Funds rate on the term structure of interest rates is of special interest. A great many papers have considered estimation of the effect of a change in the Fed Funds rate on the term structure of interest rates including Cook and Hahn (1989), Radecki and Reinhart (1994) , Roley and Sellon (1995) and Kuttner (2001) .
The conventional view of the monetary policy transmission mechanism is that a shock to the Fed Funds rate affects consumption and investment demand through its effect on long-term interest rates. If long-term interest rates are insensitive to shocks to the Fed Funds rate then monetary policy is either ineffective, or must work through other channels (Barth and Ramey (1991) or Bernanke and Gertler (1995) ).
Kuttner (2001) Kuttner, but we use intradaily data both to measure the monetary policy surprise, and to measure the effect of the surprise on other interest rates.
Our results are not inconsistent with those of Kuttner, but point to smaller and more precisely estimated effects of the monetary policy shock on long-term interest rates.
Kuttner estimated that a 100 basis point unexpected tightening of monetary policy raises 10-year yields by 31.5 basis points, with a standard error of 10.2 basis points. When Kuttner includes FOMC days on which no change in rates actually occurred, the estimate falls to 22.0 basis points, with a standard error of 9.2 basis points. Our estimate for the effect of a 100 basis point unexpected tightening in the Fed Funds rate on the 10-year U.S. interest rate is 13.3 basis points, with a standard error of 6.2 basis points. These very small estimates of the effects of monetary policy shocks on long-term interest rates are very close to those obtained by Roley and Sellon (1995) and Radecki and Reinhart (1994) .
In comparing our results with those of Kuttner (2001) , note that we run our regression only over FOMC days since March 1995. It is only for these announcements that the release came in a scheduled announcement at 2:15. Demiralp and Jorda (2003), using daily data, report some evidence that the effect of monetary policy shocks on longterm interest rates was higher before 1994 than subsequently, and is higher for intermeeting moves than for target Fed Funds rate surprises on FOMC days.
Are Announcement Days Different?
Our primary focus in this paper is on the effects of announcements on the conditional mean of asset prices, not their conditional variance. But for our method in this paper to be reasonable, it should be that asset price changes are more variable during the announcement window than in otherwise comparable windows. In Table 4 Most of the elements of this table are greater than 1, indicating that exchange rates and interest rates are indeed more volatile around announcements than at the same time on non-announcement days. Releases of CPI, PPI, GDP, retail sales, the employment report and the target Fed Funds rate are all associated with substantially elevated volatility.
The Simultaneous Effect of Surprises on Exchange Rates and Interest Rates.
We next turn to studying the simultaneous effect of macroeconomic announcements on exchange rates and interest rates. Consider the UIP relationship 
This risk premium is the expected excess return that agents require to hold foreign rather than dollar-denominated bonds. Equation (2) is simply a definition of the risk premium, which one may prefer to think of as the expected UIP deviation. Of course, UIP does not hold, and the deviations from UIP, , t k ρ , are large and highly variable.
Consider the algebraic identity obtained from taking the difference in equation (2) from before to after the announcement 
Thus, under the assumption that the risk premium is unaffected by the macro announcement, the expected future exchange rate response to a one unit announcement surprise at horizon k is simply the coefficient k β .
In Figures 3 and 4 we plot the coefficients k β obtained from estimating equation (4) For the real announcements, the general pattern is that a stronger than expected announcement appreciates the dollar. But, assuming that the announcement does nothing to the UIP risk premium, this appreciation is not expected to last, and typically is expected to be more than reversed. For example, a release of higher-than-expected nonfarm payrolls data causes a significant appreciation of the dollar today, but causes an expected depreciation in 10 years time. This trajectory of exchange rates is akin to the overshooting described by Dornbusch (1976) for shocks to the money supply.
For the price indexes (CPI and PPI), assuming that the announcement does nothing to the UIP risk premium, the projection coefficients imply that a higher than expected inflation number leads to significant expected future dollar depreciation.
The assumption that the risk premium is not affected by the data release is 
The effect of the U.S. macro announcement on the risk premium under the random walk assumption is plotted against the horizon in Figures 5 and 6 ; the risk premium is expressed at annualized rate. Generally stronger-than-expected U.S. releases lead to significant and large declines in the risk premium.
Jointly, the two exercises lay out two possibilities. Either stronger-than-expected real macro news leads to expectations of dollar depreciation in the long-run, or lead to declines in the required risk compensation for holding foreign rather than dollar denominated assets. While we do not have good models for explaining empirically observed risk premia, one might have supposed that good macro news in the U.S. would raise the relative risk in owning foreign assets. 13 If this were the case, even steeper dollar depreciation would be implied in the long-run.
The idea that a stronger-than-expected real U.S. data release that leads initially to dollar appreciation would then lead to long-term depreciation can be reconciled with theory. The macro news could indicate higher relative real rates in the short-term (say, due to a policy response) but higher inflation and nominal rates in the long-term. This is the story laid out by Gurkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2003) to account for their results regarding the effect of news on the U.S. term structure.
13 Note however that Alvarez, Atkeson and Kehoe (1999, 2003) propose a general equilibrium model in which agents have to pay a fixed cost to exchange money for assets. In this model, a positive shock to U.S. money growth raises the U.S. inflation rate, induces more agents to pay the fixed cost and participate in asset markets, and thereby lowers the foreign exchange risk premium.
Time Variation in Parameters
With our dataset covering the years 1987 to 2002, which spans two NBER recessions, we can address questions that we could not hope to answer with adequate precision using shorter samples. In particular, we can study time variation in the effect of macroeconomic releases on exchange rates and interest rates. The effect of macro surprises could vary across the business cycle or other economic conditions (see, for example, Boyd, Jagannathan and Hu (2001), Orphanides (1992) , David (1997 ), Veronesi (1999 , David and Veronesi (2001) and Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2002)). Tests of the null of parameter constancy in equation (1), using the structural stability test statistic proposed by Nyblom (1989) , and using the sup-F statistic (the maximum value of the Chow statistic over all possible break dates) are reported in Tables 5 and 6, respectively.
14 For most asset-announcement pairs, the hypothesis of parameter constancy is not rejected. Time-variation in the effect of announcements on exchange rates and interest rates does not generally seem to be a first order issue. There are however some notable exceptions. The hypothesis of parameter constancy is rejected in the regression of exchange rate returns on trade balance surprises.
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The hypothesis of parameter constancy is rejected in the regression of U.S. interest rates on PPI, CPI and nonfarm payrolls surprises.
Given that the effects of certain pieces of macroeconomic news seem to vary over time, we next turn to modeling the relationship between macroeconomic surprises and exchange rates in models that allow for parameter instability.
The Random Coefficient Regression Model
A widely used statistical model that allows for time-variation in regression parameters is the random coefficient model of Rosenberg (1972) , Cooley and Prescott (1973) , and Watson and Engle (1983) . In the context of the regression of a change in interest rates or exchange rate returns on announcement surprises, the model can be written as 
Under an assumption of normality in the errors, the parameters of the model in equation (5) can be estimated by maximum-likelihood.
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Taking the maximum likelihood estimates as given, we can do inference on the unobserved state variable t β conditional on the entire sample, using the Kalman smoother, which also provides associated standard errors. The smoothed coefficient estimates reflect our beliefs at the end of the sample period about what the responsiveness of the asset price to macroeconomic surprises was, at each point in time.
We applied this model to the effect of nonfarm payroll, PPI and trade balance surprises on exchange rates and interest rates. We picked these three announcements, because there was some evidence of parameter instability in each of their effects. The smoothed estimates of the effects of a surprise in nonfarm payrolls, PPI and the trade 16 See Harvey (1991) . We initialize the Kalman filter with a diffuse prior.
balance are shown in Figures 7, 8 and 9, respectively. Results for CPI (not shown) are quite similar to those for PPI.
In Figure 7 , we see that the sensitivity of 3-month U.S. interest rates to nonfarm payrolls releases has declined since the early 1990s. The sensitivity of the exchange rate response to nonfarm payrolls surprises peaked in the early 1990s and has declined since then.
In Figure 8 , we see that the sensitivity of interest rates to PPI announcements was high in the early years of the sample, but then declined and is no longer significantly different from zero, for interest rates of any maturity. This could reflect the interpretation of PPI news as conveying news about stronger-than-expected productivity growth, rather than demand strength, later in the sample.
In Figure 9 , we see that the sensitivity of the exchange rate to news about the trade balance was very high in the early years of the sample, but it has subsequently waned and is no longer significantly different from zero. Trade balance releases never had much effect on short term U.S. interest rates. However, a lower than expected trade deficit was estimated to lead to a reduction in 10-year U.S. interest rates in the early part of the sample, but this effect has since waned too. Indeed, the decline in the effect of trade balance surprises on 10-year yields mirrors the decline in its effect on the exchange value of the dollar.
An interpretation of this time variation in the effect of trade balance data is that in the 1980s and early 1990s, investors worried about the sustainability of the current account. Higher than expected trade deficits would be interpreted as a sign that the current account deficit is unsustainable, leading to dollar depreciation. It could also lead to an increase in yields on 10-year government bonds as the U.S. would have to offer more attractive yields to continue to get foreigners to finance the deficit for a bit longer.
But, perhaps, beginning in the mid 1990s, investors started to think of the trade deficit as reflecting a positive country-specific productivity shock, as U.S. residents seek to smooth their consumption by borrowing from abroad in anticipation of higher future income. Arguably, investors paid little attention to the possibility of a break in the trend growth rate of productivity until the mid-1990s. At that point, however, they may well have begun to take seriously the idea of a break, and hence became more prone to interpret macroeconomic data surprises as conveying news about productivity. If so, higher than expected trade deficits would be interpreted as positive productivity shocks that would, if anything, lead to dollar appreciation, by the Balassa-Samuelson effect.
Conclusion
Existing work on high frequency movements in asset prices has documented the relationship between macroeconomic announcements and asset returns around those announcements. The literature has typically focused on a single asset or asset class, in isolation of other markets which theory predicts should move simultaneously. Much of this work has used a relatively short sample period and/or calculated asset returns over fairly wide windows such as a day.
In this paper we contribute to this literature by studying the joint behavior of exchange rates and zero coupon interest rates using a long span of high frequency data.
We interpret the joint behavior of exchange rates and interest rates in the context of uncovered interest rate parity, thereby obtaining evidence on the interaction between UIP risk premia and expected exchange rate dynamics, conditional on (U.S.) macro announcements. Our work is not a test of UIP; rather, it characterizes combinations of risk premium and expected exchange rate dynamics in response to macro news that are consistent with the data.
We find that for several real U.S. macro announcements better than expected news appreciates the dollar today, consistent with existing evidence. From the responses of U.S. and foreign interest rate term structures, we are also able to infer that such releases either lower the risk premium for holding foreign currency or imply future expected dollar depreciation that exceeds the original appreciation. While we do not have good models for explaining empirically observed risk premia, one might have supposed that good macro news in the U.S. would raise the relative risk in foreign assets.
If it is implausible that stronger than expected U.S. news lowers the risk premium on foreign assets, then this could only be consistent with an even steeper path of expected dollar depreciation following the initial appreciation. This would of course be inconsistent with a random walk formulation of expected exchange rate movements.
Finally, there is some evidence of parameter instability for some announcements.
Estimating models that allow for time varying parameters, we find that the effect of price surprises on interest rates has declined over our sample period and that the effect of trade balance surprises on exchange rates has also declined. We also find some evidence for time variation in the effects of surprises to nonfarm payrolls.
Appendix: Construction of Zero-Coupon Rates In this appendix, we describe how we constructed zero-coupon yield curves from interest rate and government bond futures.
We have high frequency data on the first four eurodollar, euromark/euribor and sterling libor futures contracts. These contracts are all cash-settled to 3-month interest rates on the settlement day. By combining the prices on these short-term interest rate contracts, we obtain 3-month and 1-year zero-coupon rates.
We also have high frequency data on the prices of 10-year bond futures in the US, the UK and Germany. These futures are nominally on 10-year bonds with a specific coupon rate (e.g. presently 6% for the CBOT 10-year contract). More precisely, the futures contract is fulfilled by the party on the short side of the contract delivering any bond in a particular maturity range (e.g. presently 6.5 to 10 years for the CBOT 10-year contract) to the party on the long side of the contract at a price equal to the futures price multiplied by a conversion factor to adjust the actual coupon rate of the delivered bond to the nominal coupon rate of the futures contract (plus an adjustment for accrued interest). The party on the short side will choose the bond that is cheapest to deliver, comparing the price that she will receive for the bond relative to the value of the bond in the spot market at the time of settlement. If interest rates are below the nominal coupon rate of the futures contract, the party on the short side will typically choose to deliver a bond at the short end of the maturity range, and vice-versa. From CBOT, LIFFE and EUREX, we obtained data on the bond that was delivered for each futures contract (or the most commonly delivered bond in cases where multiple bonds were delivered). We make the assumption that agents knew that this bond would be delivered, and treat the price of the front bond futures contract, multiplied by the conversion factor, as though it were the spot price of the bond that was in fact subsequently delivered in settlement of the contract. There exist bond contracts for settlement in March, June, September and December of each year. Contracts trade for each of about the next 4 settlement dates, but only the first one or two contracts are liquid. Moreover, liquidity in a bond futures contract decays sharply during the settlement month. We therefore define the "front" bond futures contract to be the June contract in March, April and May alone, and similarly for the other contracts.
Notice that we treat the high frequency futures-based interest rates and bond prices (with a near settlement date) as though they are the underlying spot interest rates and bond prices. Trading in short-term interest rate and bond futures markets is extremely liquid: liquidity in the bond futures market is far greater than in the market for any one specific bond issue. The futures and spot instruments are very close substitutes. Besides, our cross-country long span of high frequency data is on futures instruments, not spot instruments. In this sense we do not have a choice.
We fitted the following standard zero-coupon yield curve, used by Diebold and Li (2002), Nelson and Siegel (1987) and Siegel and Nelson (1988) : matches the price of the bond futures contract (multiplied by the conversion factor for the delivered bond). In this way, we have a set of three equations in three unknowns and can get an exact fit for the parameters of the zero-coupon yield curve. We then simply compute the zero-coupon yield at the required maturities.
The structure of interest rate and bond futures contracts for the US, UK and Germany is remarkably similar, and so exactly the same methodology can be used for the US, UK and German zero-coupon yield curves. It is to preserve cross-country comparability of methodology that we do not use prices of CBOT 5 year Treasury bond futures, even though we have these data too. There is no comparable futures contract for UK bonds, and there is insufficient history of such a contract for German bonds.
This procedure for obtaining high frequency observations on a zero-coupon yield curve is far from ideal. It effectively obtains the yield curve from just 3 points, which is fewer than is used in standard yield curve analysis (though can still identify level, slope and curvature). It treats the interest rate and bond futures prices as though they were spot prices. The party on the short side of the bond futures contract in fact has the option of choosing which bond to deliver, and the futures price incorporates the value of this optionality. By assuming that the parties to the futures contract knew ahead of time which bond would in fact be delivered, we are neglecting this option value. Also, our zero-coupon yield curve is neither a pure eurodollar nor a pure Treasury yield curve. Treasury and eurodollar interest rates are different because the latter incorporate some credit risk. The spread between Treasury and eurodollar rates, known as the TED spread, reflects the premium for this credit risk, and is typically about 20 basis points or less, but can be higher at times of market stress.
We are quite aware of these shortcomings. However, our object of ultimate interest is not the zero-coupon yield curves themselves, but rather the changes in zerocoupon rates from just before to just after a macro announcement. Many of these issues we cite above are likely to have about the same effect on the yield curve before and after the macro announcement, and so will difference out. For example, unless the macro announcement has a large effect on the TED spread, the inappropriate mixing of Treasury and eurodollar prices should approximately difference out. It likewise seems plausible to us to assume that the value of the delivery option held by the party on the short side of a bond futures contract should approximately difference out. (1)). One, two and three asterisks denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively, using White standard errors. No constant is included in the regression. The (uncentered) R-squared from each regression is also reported. A positive exchange rate return denotes dollar depreciation. Exchange rate returns are continuously compounded, multiplied by 10,000. So the elements of the table can be interpreted as the effect of a one unit surprise on the exchange rate, in basis points. The signs of the announcement surprises in the countercyclical indicators denoted with the † symbol have been flipped. deviation of intradaily exchange rate returns or changes in zero-coupon interest rates, over the 20 minutes window around each macro announcement, divided by the corresponding standard deviation over the same window on days when there is no macro announcement. The results for the unemployment release are identical to those for nonfarm payrolls (and hence not shown separately) because the unemployment and nonfarm payrolls releases are always simultaneous. The row labeled US 10y is the change in the US 10 year zero-coupon interest rate, and the other interest rate rows are labeled analogously. Expected Pound (10 years)
